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The Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign 
Relations Law: Discouraging State Courts 
From Recognizing Foreign-Country Money 
Judgments in Absence of Debtor’s Assets 
 
Debashish Bakshi* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
On July 27, 2010, Her Majesty’s High Court of Justice in England 
ruled that a Saudi Arabian conglomerate had defaulted on certain loans 
borrowed from an Emirati commercial bank.1  To remedy this breach of 
contract, the English court awarded the bank costs and damages that 
ultimately exceeded forty million dollars.2  In August 2011, the bank 
moved to “domesticate”3 the English judgment in New York  a state in 
which the Saudi company did no business.  Over the Saudi company’s 
objections, a trial court recognized the English judgment and an appellate 
panel affirmed the decision unanimously.4  At this point, civil procedure 
enthusiasts should be scratching their heads: How could a judge in Lower 
Manhattan have any power over a Middle Eastern entity that had no 
meaningful connection to the Empire State? 
To curtail overextension by state tribunals, the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment limits a court’s exercise of power over 
 
*   J.D. Candidate 2016, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.  B.A. 2010, 
Stanford University.  A special thank you to Professor William S. Dodge, who currently serves as Co-
Reporter for the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law: 
Jurisdiction; this Note would not have been possible without his guidance, feedback, and eternal 
patience.  For their considerable effort and assistance, I also thank all staff at Hastings Business Law 
Journal.  This Note is dedicated to my parents, Mrinal Kanti Bakshi and Aparna Bakshi. 
 1. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank PJSC v. Saad Trading, Contracting & Fin. Servs. Co., 986 
N.Y.S.2d 454, 454 (App. Div. 2014). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Domestication (or “recognition”) is the process of “turn[ing] a judgment from a U.S. federal 
court, a judgment from a court in another state, or a judgment from another country into an enforceable 
[forum] state judgment.” MIKE ENGLEHART, PROCEDURE FOR ENFORCING FOREIGN STATE, FEDERAL, 
AND FOREIGN COUNTRY JUDGMENTS IN TEXAS, RENEWAL OF TEXAS JUDGMENTS, AND REVIVAL OF 
DORMANT TEXAS JUDGMENTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RECENT CASE LAW 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/procedure-for-enforcing-foreign-state-f-69507/. 
 4. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 986 N.Y.S.2d at 457–58. 
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nonresident defendants.5  To satisfy personal jurisdiction, defendants must 
have sufficient contacts, ties, or relations with the forum state6 such that it 
would be fair and reasonable to compel them to participate in and respond 
to the action against them.7  Furthermore, in Shaffer v. Heitner,8 the 
Supreme Court declared that the mere presence of a defendant’s property in 
a given state is an insufficient basis for personal jurisdiction if the property 
is unrelated to the underlying claim.9  Nevertheless, the Court suggested in 
dicta that in a state where a defendant holds assets, a court may enforce a 
valid out-of-state judgment regardless of the court’s jurisdiction as to the 
original claim.10  The process of satisfying an out-of-state money judgment, 
however, involves two distinct and independent steps: recognition and 
enforcement.11  Furthermore, parties may seek recognition for purposes 
other than enforcement in the recognizing jurisdiction.12  But the Court in 
Shaffer did not address whether courts must have personal jurisdiction over 
judgment debtors if creditors merely seek to domesticate a judgment 
separately from an enforcement action.13 
The Note proceeds in three parts.  Part II begins by discussing state 
mechanisms of recognition and enforcement.  Part III then surveys state 
court interpretations of Shaffer’s Footnote 36 and resolves the apparent 
discrepancy in recent cases concerning the absence of assets.  Finally, in 
Part IV, this Note evaluates the American Law Institute’s (“ALI”) tentative 
language on this issue and explores why it is a necessary piece of reform in 
U.S. foreign relations law.  If a state court does not otherwise have personal 
jurisdiction over a debtor, the court should decline to recognize foreign-
country money judgments in the absence of the debtor’s assets.  Given the 
complexity of the foreign-country judgment recognition process and its 
subsequent effect on a debtor’s rights, a judgment debtor should not have to 
appear and dispute recognition in any jurisdiction in which they have 
neither property nor meaningful contacts. 
 
 
 5. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980). 
 6. Id. at 294 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). 
 7. Id. at 292 (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). 
 8. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
 9. Id. at 209. 
 10. See id. at 210 n. 36.  The Court reasoned that applying strict International Shoe requirements to 
the enforcing jurisdiction would allow a judgment debtor to easily skirt their obligations by transferring 
their assets to a state with which they had insufficient minimum contacts.  See id. at 210. 
 11. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: JURISDICTION & JUDGMENTS § 481 
cmt. b (1987) (“Recognition and enforcement distinguished.”).  Out-of-state judgments addressed in 
this Note are limited to decisions where the remedy is money (hence “money judgments”) as opposed to 
equitable relief.  A successful claimant seeking to domesticate the out-of-state decision is therefore the 
“judgment creditor” and accordingly the unsuccessful party is the “judgment debtor.” 
 12. Id. 
 13. See generally Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 186. 
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II.  MECHANISMS OF RECOGNIZING OUT-OF-STATE 
JUDGMENTS. 
 
In addition to adjudicating domestic disputes, courts in the United 
States may recognize and enforce out-of-state judgments.  For example, 
state courts routinely recognize money judgments rendered in other states14 
(“sister-state” judgments) or nations15 (“foreign-country” judgments).  As 
discussed below, courts often conflate recognition with enforcement.  
Furthermore, courts sometimes treat foreign-country judgments in the same 
manner as sister-state decisions.  Unfortunately, courts’ failure to 
distinguish these distinct and meaningful categories has led to unnecessary 
discord, confusion, and unfairness. 
 
A.  THE INDEPENDENT PROCESSES OF RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT 
 
Recognition is the domestication of an out-of-state judgment such that 
it has the same effect as any local judgment.16  Enforcement, on the other 
hand, is the satisfaction of a judgment debt.17  Although procedures and 
collection mechanisms may vary from state to state, the process of 
enforcement typically involves serving “information” subpoenas to locate 
and identify property,18 liens to secure an interest in the property,19 
restraining notices to “freeze” bank accounts,20 and writs of execution to 
seize and transfer assets.21 
 
 
 14. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public 
acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state.  And the Congress may by general laws 
prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect 
thereof.”).  Common examples include “deadbeat parent” cases where state courts recognize out-of-
state divorce decrees.  Once the divorce is domesticated, the out-of-state parent can take enforcement 
actions to collect money to satisfy unpaid alimony and child support payments. 
 15. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, at § 481(1) (“[A] final judgment of a court of a foreign state 
granting or denying recovery of a sum of money, establishing or confirming the status of a person, or 
determining interests in property, is conclusive between the parties, and is entitled to recognition in 
courts in the United States.”). 
 16. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, at § 481 cmt. b (“Effect of foreign judgment.”). 
 17. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, at § 481 cmt. g (“Proceedings to enforce foreign judgments in 
the United States.”). 
 18. See JAMES J. BROWN, JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT § 3.01 (“The objective of postjudgment 
discovery is to determine whether the debtor has assets or whether there may be methods for collecting 
assets from third parties as a result of their relationship with the debtor.”).  
 19. See id. at § 12.07 (“The judgment creditor may place a lien on the judgment debtor’s real or 
personal property in order to secure the judgment.”). 
 20. See id. at § 15.05 (“Most commonly, restraining notices are served upon local banking 
branches or financial institutions in an effort to restrain the funds in the bank account, so that the funds 
can be executed upon.”). 
 21. See id. (“[A]ll property that is subject to enforcement of a money judgment is subject to levy 
under a writ of execution to satisfy a money judgment.”). 
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Judgment creditors primarily seek recognition to enforce a money 
judgment where the judgment debtors’ assets are beyond the reach of the 
court rendering the original judgment.  Specifically, a creditor will seek 
recognition to satisfy a debt where the assets are present in the recognizing 
state.  Alternatively, a creditor can pursue domestication in a given state 
and then leverage the newly recognized judgment to seek enforcement in 
yet another state22 or country.23  Enforcement, however, is not the only 
reason to seek recognition.24  Either party, for example, may seek 
recognition for res judicata or collateral estoppel purposes to preclude 
relitigation of claims and issues resolved in the original out-of-state 
judgment.25 
 
B.  STATUTORY FRAMEWORKS FOR RECOGNITION AND CORRESPONDING 
SCRUTINY OF COURTS RENDERING ORIGINAL JUDGMENT 
 
Although courts may recognize both sister-state and foreign-country 
judgments, states apply more rigorous procedures to the latter.  The 
respective mechanisms of domestication reflect the fundamental 
differences between the two types of out-of-state judgments. 
 
1.  Sister-State Judgments 
 
Courts afford sister-state judgments considerable deference on 
constitutional, practical, and cultural grounds.  First, and most importantly, 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires states to respect the “judicial 
proceedings of every other state.”26  Second, given the ease of mobility 
within the United States, skeptical treatment of sister-state judgments 
 
 22. See ROBERT E. LUTZ, A LAWYER’S HANDBOOK FOR ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND ABROAD 29 (2007) (“If circumstances in the state where you are ultimately 
seeking conversion do not favor recognition, an alternative strategy . . .  is to seek a judgment in another 
state under that state’s foreign country judgments recognition procedures, and then establish the 
recognized judgment in your state as a sister-state judgment.”).   State courts, however, are split on 
whether foreign judgments recognized by other states are entitled to full faith and credit.  Compare 
Standard Chartered Bank v. Ahmad Hamad Al Gosaibi, 99 A.3d 936 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2014) 
(affording full faith and credit to Bahraini judgment domesticated in New York) with Ahmad Hamad Al 
Gosaibi & Bros. Co. v. Standard Chartered Bank, No. 13-CV-1415, 2014 WL 4356135 (D.C. Ct. App. 
Sept. 4, 2014) (declining to afford full faith and credit to the same domesticated judgment).  The ALI’s 
tentative draft Restatement takes the position that U.S. judgments recognizing foreign judgments are not 
entitled to full faith and credit.  See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 401 cmt g. 
 23. See, e.g., Electrolines, Inc. v. Prudential Assurance Co., Ltd., 260 Mich. App. 144, 148 (2003) 
(seeking recognition of Liberian judgment in Michigan to ultimately enforce against defendant’s assets 
in England). 
 24. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, at § 481 cmt. b (“Effect of foreign judgment.”). 
 25. See id. 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.  
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would frustrate the enforcement of judgments.27  Third, state courts are 
generally rooted in the same legal customs and traditions and thus a judge 
is less likely to second-guess the propriety of a sister-state judgment. 
Nearly all U.S. states and territories have adopted a straightforward 
administrative process to domesticate sister-state judgments without having 
to bring a new common law action.28  The Enforcement Act enables 
recognition by simply having the party seeking enforcement of the 
judgment file the judgment with the court29 and provide notice to the 
judgment debtor.30  Under the Enforcement Act, a debtor may request a 
stay in recognition proceedings upon a showing of appeal.31  A debtor may 
also challenge the personal jurisdiction of the court rendering the original 
judgment, but may not relitigate the underlying claim.  In the sister-state 
context, however, the burden is on the debtor to raise and demonstrate lack 
of personal jurisdiction.32  In other words, the original court’s power over 
the judgment debtor is a rebuttable presumption.  In sum, courts seem to 
recognize sister-state judgments without much scrutiny. 
 
2.  Foreign Country Judgments 
 
Unlike sister-state judgments, state courts examine foreign-country 
judgments more closely.  This is due in part to the fact that state judges are 
less familiar with legal systems outside of the United States and that the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause applies to other states in the union, not other 
countries.  In Hilton v. Guyot, the Supreme Court identified several 
grounds for declining to recognize foreign judgments, including the foreign 
court’s lack of jurisdiction, inadequate process, and fraud.33  Following 
Hilton, most state courts recognized and enforced foreign country 
 
 27. C.f. UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT eds. notes (1948) (revised 1964) (“The 
mobility, today, of both persons and property is such that existing procedure for the enforcement of 
judgments in those cases where the judgment debtor has removed himself and his property from the 
state in which the judgment was rendered, is inadequate.”). 
 28. See generally REVISED UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT (1964) 
(“Enforcement Act”).  Although the Enforcement Act discusses the “enforcement” of “foreign 
judgments,” the statute in fact speaks to the recognition of sister-state judgments rather than the 
satisfaction of foreign-country judgments.  See id. 
 29. See id. at § 2.  
 30. See id. at § 3. 
 31. See id. at § 4. 
 32. See Law Firm of Paul L. Erickson, P.A. v. Boykin, 681 S.E.2d 575, 579 (S.C. 2009) (holding 
South Carolina Enforcement Act provision unconstitutional for placing burden on creditor). 
 33. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); see also Cedric C. Chao & Christine S. Neuhoff, 
Enforcement and Recognition of Foreign Judgments in United States Courts: A Practical Perspective, 
29 PEPP. L. REV. 147, 150 (2001) (noting how courts in common law jurisdictions have followed Hilton 
criteria except for the Court’s “reciprocity” requirement). 
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judgments based on the common law principle of the “comity of nations.”34  
A clear majority of states, however, have now standardized the process of 
recognition (and grounds for nonrecognition) by adopting one of two 
uniform acts that codified the common law of recognizing foreign-country 
judgments.35 
The Recognition Act allows a state court to recognize foreign 
judgments once they are final and conclusive.36  Furthermore, the 
Recognition Act forbids recognition where the foreign country’s judiciary 
system does not provide impartial tribunals.37 The Recognition Act also 
prohibits state courts from recognizing foreign debt judgments where the 
foreign court lacked personal38 or subject-matter jurisdiction.39  The 
Recognition Act then provides several grounds for the court to refuse 
recognition at the court’s discretion.40  In contrast to Enforcement Act 
plaintiffs, judgment creditors under the Recognition Act have the burden of 
demonstrating the foreign country judgment is entitled to recognition.41  
This includes demonstrating that the foreign court had personal jurisdiction 
over the debtor.42  In testing the personal jurisdiction of the original court, 
U.S. courts have generally applied International Shoe standards rather than 
the foreign judiciary’s own procedural requirements.43  Given the purposes 
and criteria of the Recognition Act, state courts do not (or rather should 
not) treat the recognition of foreign country judgments as readily  and 
with as little scrutiny  as they do for sister-state judgments under the 
Enforcement Act. 
 
 
 
 34. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 113; Comity of nations “is the recognition which one nation allows within 
its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to 
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are 
under the protection of its laws.”  Id. at 164. 
 35. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (2005) [herinafter 
“Recognition Act”].  
 36. Id. at § 2 (“Applicability). 
 37. Id. at § 4(a)(1). 
 38. Id. at § 4(a)(2). 
 39. Id. at § 4(a)(3). 
 40. Id. at § 4(b).  These grounds include circumstances where the debtor did not receive adequate 
notice of the foreign court proceedings, the judgment was obtained by fraud, the underlying claim is 
repugnant to state public policy, the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment, the 
foreign court proceedings were contrary to an agreement between parties, or the foreign court was a 
“seriously inconvenient forum.”  Id. 
 41. See, e.g., Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 986 N.Y.S.2d at 457–58 (“[T]he legislature reasonably 
placed the burden on the proponent of a foreign judgment of showing that the foreign court was 
impartial and followed basic principles of due process.”). 
 42. See Recognition Act §§ 4(a)(2), 5. 
 43. See, e.g., de la Mata v. Am. Life Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 1375, 1383–84 (D. Del. 1991) aff’d, 
961 F.2d 208 (3d Cir. 1992); Koster v. Automark Indus., Inc., 640 F.2d 77, 79 (7th Cir. 1981). 
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III.  PERSONAL JURISDICTION OF COURTS RECOGNIZING 
JUDGMENT 
 
Shaffer v. Heitner foreclosed the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction 
in cases where the defendant’s in-state property was unrelated to the out-of-
state claim.44  The Shaffer Court, however, suggested in Footnote 36 that a 
state court need not have jurisdiction over a judgment debtor when 
enforcing a sister-state money judgment against the debtor’s assets: 
 
Once it has been determined by a court of competent 
jurisdiction that the defendant is a debtor of the plaintiff, 
there would seem to be no unfairness in allowing an action 
to realize on that debt in a State where the defendant has 
property, whether or not that State would have jurisdiction to 
determine the existence of the debt as an original matter.45 
 
The Court explained that a debtor should not be able to “avoid paying 
his obligations by removing his property to a state in which his creditor 
cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over him.”46  The Court further noted 
that “[t]he Full Faith and Credit Clause . . . makes the valid in personam 
judgment of one State enforceable in all other States.”47 
Shaffer’s Footnote 36 was the Supreme Court’s last word on whether 
courts recognizing or enforcing out-of-state money judgments require 
personal jurisdiction over debtors.48  Furthermore, state-based Recognition 
Acts are silent on this issue.49  Finally, Congress has not passed any statutes 
that could address the question by federalizing the recognition process.  As 
a result, state court opinions best indicate the state of the law and its 
trajectory.50 
Over the past thirty-nine years since Shaffer, state courts across the 
country have cited to and interpreted Footnote 36 to determine personal 
jurisdiction requirements over non-resident judgment debtors.  Indeed, 
courts have discussed Footnote 36 in recognition and enforcement 
 
 44. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 209. 
 45. Shaffer, 433. U.S. at 210, n.36 (“Footnote 36”). 
 46. See id. at 210. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See, e.g., Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 986 N.Y.S.2d at 458–59 (referring to Shaffer alone for 
guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court). 
 49. See generally supra note 35. 
 50. Federal courts sometimes recognize and enforce foreign country judgments, but typically when 
sitting in diversity and thus applying state domestication laws.  Despite calls to nationalize the treatment 
of foreign country judgments, no federal laws preempt state recognition and enforcement procedures.  
On the other hand, district courts have exclusive jurisdiction to evaluate and domesticate international 
arbitral awards under the Federal Arbitration Act.  See 22 U.S.C.A. § 290k-11(2) (West). 
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proceedings concerning both sister-state and foreign-country judgments. 
 
A.  FOOTNOTE 36 IN ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS 
 
Consistent with Footnote 36, courts agree that they need not have 
personal jurisdiction over debtors to enforce judgments against out-of-state 
judgment debtors.51  The debtor, however, must still possess property in-
state to satisfy Due Process.  In the few cases where the presence of the 
debtor’s domestic assets were contested, courts have understandably 
disfavored enforcement where the creditor has failed to identify said 
assets.52  Courts have held this position in cases involving not only sister-
state decisions, but also foreign country judgments.53  Moreover, no court 
has held that a creditor may initiate enforcement proceedings in the absence 
of property.  Intuitively, permitting enforcement would be impractical, 
unfair, and illogical where there is simply no debtor property to identify, 
seize, and transfer. The consensus with respect to enforcement, however, 
stands in contrast to the apparent discord among state courts regarding the 
need for personal jurisdiction in recognition proceedings. 
 
B.  FOOTNOTE 36 IN RECOGNITION PROCEEDINGS 
 
Given that most creditors seek recognition to quickly enforce against 
debtor’s identifiable assets in the same jurisdiction, few Footnote 36 cases 
have specifically addressed recognition independently of enforcement.54  
Furthermore, only New York,55 Texas,56 and Michigan57 courts have 
 
 51. See, e.g., Arbor Farms, LLC v. GeoStar Corp., 314911, 2014 WL 2197846, at *3–5 (Mich. Ct. 
App. May 27, 2014); Koh v. Inno-Pac. Holdings, Ltd., 54 P.3d 1270, 1272–73 (Wash. App. 2002); 
Kingsland Holding, Inc. v. Bracco, No. CIV. A. 14817, 1996 WL 104257 (Del. Ch. Mar. 5, 1996); 
UMS Partners, Ltd. v. Jackson, 94J-12-159H-17-076, 1995 WL 413395 (Del. Sup. Ct. June 15, 1995); 
Tabet v. Tabet, 644 So. 2d 557, 559 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Gwinnett Prop., N.V. v. GH Montage 
GmbH, 215 Ga. App. 889, 895 (1994); Sagona v. Doty, 25 Va. Cir. 529 (1991); First v. State, Dep’t of 
Soc. & Rehab. Servs. ex rel. LaRoche, 247 Mont. 465, 474–75 (1991); Ruiz v. Lloses, 559 A.2d 866, 
867–68 (N.J. App. Div. 1989); Fraser v. Littlejohn, 96 N.C. App. 377, 379–81 (1989); see also Joseph 
E. Neuhaus, Current Issues in the Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards, 36 U. MIAMI 
INTER-AM. L. REV. 23, 29 (2004) (collecting cases to support proposition that “[a]fter Shaffer, state 
courts throughout the country have regularly applied ‘quasi in rem’ jurisdiction in cases seeking to 
enforce foreign-state judgments, without imposing any requirement that the property be related to the 
subject matter of the dispute”). 
 52. See, e.g., Williamson v. Williamson, 275 S.E.2d 42, 43 (1981) (federal courts have also applied 
this rationale when declining to enforce international arbitral awards).  See, e.g., Glencore Grain 
Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1127–28 (9th Cir. 2002); accord 
Cargnani v. Pewag Austria G.m.b.H., No. CIV. S-05-0133 WBSJF, 2007 WL 415992 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 
2007). 
 53. See generally supra note 52.  
 54. See, e.g., Pure Fishing, Inc. v. Silver Star Co., 202 F. Supp. 2d 905, 910 (N.D. Iowa 2002). 
 55. Lenchyshyn v. Pelko Elec., Inc., 281 A.D.2d 42, 47–50 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). 
 56. Haaksman v. Diamond Offshore (Bermuda), Ltd., 260 S.W.3d 476, 480 (Tex. App. 2008). 
   
Winter 2016 FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS 289 
addressed their own personal jurisdiction in the context of recognizing 
foreign-country judgments.  New York and Texas have taken the position 
that in-state assets are not required for pure recognition purposes.  On the 
other hand, the ALI’s draft Restatement (Fourth) on Foreign Relations Law 
interprets Michigan’s position in Electrolines, Inc. v. Prudential Assurance 
Co. as requiring such assets for recognition, and is therefore in conflict 
with New York’s decision in Lenchyshyn v. Pelko Electric and its progeny.  
Upon closer review, however, the court’s holding in Electrolines concerned 
enforcement rather than recognition alone and thus does not stand for 
anything more than the uncontroversial position that in-state assets are a 
prerequisite to enforcement. 
 
1.  Lenchyshyn and Abu Dhabi. 
 
New York courts have held that personal jurisdiction over a debtor is 
not required to recognize a foreign-country judgment.58  In Lenchyshyn — 
the first case in the United States addressing this issue — Michael 
Lenchyshyn sought both recognition and enforcement of a Canadian money 
judgment resulting from his intellectual property claims against Pelko 
Electric, Inc.59  Upon service of process, Pelko unsuccessfully moved to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, claiming that the company had no 
presence or business in New York.60  Lenchyshyn, on the other hand, 
argued Pelko had a “jurisdictional nexus” with New York based on 
allegations of hidden funds and significant commercial activity.61 
Affirming on appeal, the Lenchyshyn court held that neither the U.S. 
Constitution nor New York law required a “jurisdictional basis” for 
recognizing foreign-country judgments.62  First, the court determined that 
while New York’s version of the Recognition Act had several enumerated 
bases for non-recognition, the personal jurisdiction of the New York court 
recognizing the judgment is not one of them and its absence was a “telling 
omission.”63  Second, citing Footnote 36, the court concluded that personal 
jurisdiction was not required by the Due Process clause for recognition 
purposes.64  Third, the court did not believe the procedural differences 
between the Recognition and Enforcement Acts implied “additional 
jurisdictional requirements to be satisfied in proceedings to obtain 
 
 57. Electrolines, Inc. v. Prudential Assurance Co., 677 N.W.2d 874, 883–85 (Mich. App. 2003). 
 58. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 986 N.Y.S.2d at 454; Lenchyshyn, 281 A.D.2d at 47–50. 
 59. Lenchyshyn, 281 A.D.2d at 43. 
 60. Id. at 44. 
 61. Id. at 44–45. 
 62. Id. at 47. 
 63. Id. at 48–49. 
 64. Id. at 47–48. 
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recognition.”65  While acknowledging the formality and complexity of 
domesticating foreign-country judgments, the court decided that 
Recognition Act requirements “should not be viewed as allowing the 
judgment debtor to raise nonstatutory obstacles to recognition of the 
foreign-country money judgment.”66 
Fourth, characterizing the recognition process as a “ministerial 
function,” the court surmised that imposing additional personal jurisdiction 
requirements would be unfair and impractical for creditors because “[m]ost 
devices for the enforcement of money judgments operate in rem against the 
real or personal property of the judgment debtor, or in personam against 
third parties, such as banks, investment firms, employers, or other third-
party garnishees, obligors or debtors of the judgment debtor.”67  Fifth, the 
court deemed Lenchyshyn had sufficiently alleged Pelko’s New York 
assets and that “[s]uch assets and/or debts would have a New York situs, 
which is all that is required to subject them to levy or restraint here as a 
means of enforcing the domesticated Ontario judgment.”68  Finally, the 
Lenchyshyn court opined that even in the absence of assets, courts should 
recognize judgments to allow creditors to enforce against later-acquired 
property;  
 
[m]oreover, even if defendants do not presently have assets 
in New York, plaintiffs nevertheless should be granted 
recognition of the foreign country money judgment pursuant 
to CPLR article 53, and thereby should have the opportunity 
to pursue all such enforcement steps in futuro, whenever it 
might appear that defendants are maintaining assets in New 
York, including at any time during the initial life of the 
domesticated Ontario money judgment or any subsequent 
renewal period.69 
 
Lenchyshyn therefore required domestic assets for enforcement of 
foreign-country judgments, but opened the door to the possibility of 
recognition in absence of such assets. 
In 2014, a New York court applied Lenchyshyn to affirm recognition 
of a forty-million dollar English judgment, despite debtor’s lack of in-state 
property.70  As in Lenchyshyn, the court in Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank 
 
 65. Lenchyshyn, 281 A.D.2d at 49. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 49–50. 
 68. Id. at 50. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 986 N.Y.S.2d at 454–55.  
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PJSC v. Saad Trading, Contr. & Fin. Servs. Co expressly rejected debtor’s 
contention that the stricter requirements of foreign-country recognition 
implied jurisdictional requirements beyond those specified in the 
Recognition Act.71  The court further stated that because “[New York’s 
rules of civil procedure] and the English court are already protecting the 
defendant’s due process rights, including personal jurisdiction, the court 
charged with recognition and enforcement should not be required to grant 
further protection during a ministerial enforcement action.”72  Lastly, in a 
reference to Footnote 36, the Abu Dhabi court believed “[t]here is no 
unfairness to the defendant if the plaintiff obtains an order in New York 
recognizing the foreign judgment, which can then be enforced if the 
defendant is found to have, or later brings, property into the State.”73  New 
York has therefore established itself as a permissive arena for judgment 
creditors strategically seeking recognition without the prospect of 
immediate enforcement.74 
 
2.  The Electrolines-Haaksman “Disagreement” 
 
Declining to follow Abu Dhabi, Michigan courts require jurisdiction 
over debtors or their property to domesticate foreign country judgments.75  
In Electrolines, Electrolines, Inc. sought recognition of a Liberian 
judgment against several European insurance companies, with the ulterior 
motive of ultimately seizing defendants’ assets in the United Kingdom.76  
Among other reasons, the trial court found in summary disposition that the 
court’s personal jurisdiction over the insurance companies was irrelevant to 
Recognition Act proceedings.77 
Reversing on appeal, the Electrolines court held creditors must 
demonstrate personal jurisdiction because the entry of judgment is 
governed by the Enforcement Act and therefore constitutes an enforcement 
action.78  Furthermore, by examining the language of the creditor’s 
complaint and other filings, the court believed Electrolines sought not just 
 
 71. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 986 N.Y.S.2d at 455. 
 72. Id. at 458. 
 73. Id. (citation omitted). 
 74. C.f. CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp. N.V., 100 N.Y.2d 215, 221 (2003) (“New 
York has traditionally been a generous forum in which to enforce judgments for money damages 
rendered by foreign courts”).  New York becomes an even more attractive venue for judgment creditors 
when considering that a New York court may compel a bank within their jurisdiction to deliver the 
judgment debtor’s out-of-state assets.  Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 12 N.Y.3d 533, 536 (2009). 
 75. Electrolines, 677 N.W.2d at 880. 
 76. Id. at 877–78.  This lawsuit arose from an insurance claim filed by Electrolines, Inc., for 
property damage resulting from a fire at its store and factory in Monrovia, Liberia.  See id. 
 77. Id. at 877. 
 78. Id. at 882. 
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recognition, but also enforcement.79  The Electrolines court also reasoned 
that in “establish[ing] that personal jurisdiction is not a prerequisite to its 
recognition and enforcement action,” the “holding of Lenchyshyn is helpful 
only where a party demonstrates that property of the judgment debtor is 
located within the jurisdiction of the court.”80  The court also stated: 
 
However, plaintiff overlooks that the judgment debtors in 
Lenchyshyn had assets in the enforcing state, to wit, bank 
accounts in Buffalo, New York, and a New York corporation 
where one of the defendants was a principal.  Although the 
Lenchyshyn court concluded that personal jurisdiction was 
not required, the Lenchyshyn court acquired jurisdiction 
because the defendants had property in New York.  Indeed, 
the Lenchyshyn court concluded that “[a]t bottom, 
defendants take the illogical and inequitable position that a 
judgment debtor’s New York assets should be immune from 
execution or restraint so long as the judgment debtor absents 
himself from New York . . . .”  Thus, the holding of 
Lenchyshyn is helpful only where a party demonstrates that 
property of the judgment debtor is located within the 
jurisdiction of the court.81 
 
Holding that the creditor had failed to demonstrate the Michigan trial 
court’s personal jurisdiction over the debtors, Electrolines reversed the 
lower court’s order.82 
Texas courts, on the other hand, have followed Lenchyshyn to 
recognize foreign-country money judgments despite the absence of debtor 
assets.83  In Haaksman v. Diamond Offshore (Bermuda), Ltd., creditors 
sought recognition of a Dutch judgment against their former employer, 
Diamond Offshore (Bermuda), Ltd. (“Diamond Bermuda”).84  In response, 
Diamond Bermuda contested the trial court’s personal jurisdiction by filing 
for a special appearance and moving for nonrecognition.85  Although 
creditors asserted Diamond Bermuda was subject to general jurisdiction 
due to their contacts with the state, the trial court nevertheless granted 
special appearance.86  Reversing on appeal, the Haaksman court rejected 
 
 79. Electrolines, 677 N.W.2d at 883–84. 
 80. Id. at 885. 
 81. Electrolines, 677 N.W.2d at 877. 
 82. Id. at 889. 
 83. Haaksman, 260 S.W.3d at 480. 
 84. Id. at 478. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
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Diamond Bermuda’s contention that the trial court “lacked a valid basis for 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over appellee, [and] therefore, the 
foreign judgment should not be recognized in Texas.”87  While 
acknowledging that Texas’ Recognition Act permitted challenges to the 
personal jurisdiction of the foreign court, the Haaksman court noted the 
Recognition Act did not require the recognizing court to have such 
jurisdiction over the debtor.88  In their appeal, Diamond Bermuda relied on 
Electrolines to support their proposition that a court considering 
recognition must determine personal jurisdiction if the debtor has no in-
state property.89 
Rejecting this argument, the Haaksman court pointed out that 
Lenchyshyn permitted recognition in the absence of debtor assets to “have 
the opportunity to pursue all such enforcement steps in [the] future.”90  The 
Haaksman court concluded that “even if a judgment debtor does not 
currently have property in Texas, a judgment creditor should be allowed 
the opportunity to obtain recognition of his foreign-money judgment and 
later pursue enforcement if or when the judgment debtor appears to be 
maintaining assets in Texas.”91 
Haaksman was right to note that Electrolines ignored Lenchyshyn’s 
language regarding recognition in the absence of assets.  Electrolines, 
however, was correct as a matter of law in requiring personal jurisdiction; 
the Michigan court’s error was in misinterpreting the creditor’s pleadings 
as a demand for both recognition and enforcement of the Liberian 
judgment.  In line with the consensus position discussed above, the court 
then ruled against Electrolines because enforcement requires presence of 
assets.  As a result, the court’s mistake was not in their statement of law 
concerning enforcement, but rather in their strained interpretation of the 
relief sought.  Given their express desire to leverage the anticipated 
Michigan judgment to pursue debtor’s assets in England, creditors were not 
seeking ultimate enforcement in Michigan.92  Furthermore, even if the 
creditor sought enforcement in Michigan post-recognition, Electrolines 
could not proceed if they failed to identify the debtor’s in-state assets for 
seizure.93  Finally, remembering that the Enforcement Act is a mechanism 
to recognize sister-state judgments, the Electrolines court assumed actions 
falling under the Enforcement Act necessarily constitute enforcement 
 
 87. Haaksman, 260 S.W.3d at 479. 
 88. Id. at 479–80. 
 89. Id. at 480. 
 90. Id. at 481. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Electrolines, 677 N.W.2d at 878. 
 93. Id. 
   
294 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 12:2 
proceedings.94  On the contrary, as noted in the court’s opinion, judgments 
filed under Michigan’s Enforcement Act are recognized, but not yet 
enforced because they have “the same effect and is subject to the same 
procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying 
as a judgment of the circuit court, the district court, or a municipal court of 
this state and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner.”95  By failing to 
distinguish recognition and enforcement proceedings, and their respective 
functions and requirements, the Electrolines court erred by adamantly 
characterizing the creditor’s action for recognition as the pursuit of 
enforcement. 
Despite the court’s mischaracterization of the creditor’s pleadings and 
misconstruction of the Enforcement Act, Electrolines does not conflict with 
Lenchyshyn or its progeny.  As a matter of law, Electrolines is limited to 
the consensus position that in-state assets are a necessary prerequisite to 
enforcement, not recognition alone.  In fact, at the outset of their analysis, 
the Electrolines court stated “[t]he facts of this case do not require us to 
decide the jurisdictional requirements of a complaint brought solely under 
the [Recognition Act].”96  As a result, Lenchyshyn remains unchallenged by 
state courts outside of New York: To recognize foreign-country money 
judgments, courts need not have jurisdiction over debtors or their property.  
Due process concerns, however, militate against this position. 
 
IV.  IS RECOGNITION FAIR IN JURISDICTIONS ALIEN TO 
DEBTORS? 
 
Taken together, Footnote 36 and Lenchyshyn are appealing 
propositions for international judgment creditors.  The ALI, however, 
asserts that the Lenchyshyn court and its adherents have misread Footnote 
36 in dispensing with the personal jurisdiction requirement.97 
The ALI–a national organization of distinguished legal professionals 
 guides judges and practitioners by publishing scholarly work that 
organizes black letter law, addresses uncertainties, and recommends areas 
of reform.98  One of the ALI’s projects, the Restatement of The Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States, was last revised in 1987 and the ALI is 
now in the process of updating it for the fourth edition.99  On May 19, 
 
 94. Electrolines, 677 N.W.2d at 883. 
 95. Id. (emphasis added) 
 96. Id. 
 97. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: JURISDICTION & JUDGMENTS § 402 
Reporter’s Note 3. (2014) (Tentative Draft No. 1). 
 98. About ALI, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (Jan. 8, 2016, 6:55 PM), https://www.ali.org/about-ali/. 
 99. The Foreign Relations Law of the United States, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (Jan. 8, 2016, 
6:57 PM), https://www.ali.org/projects/show/foreign-relations-law-united-states/. 
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2014, ALI’s membership approved a tentative draft of sections concerning 
jurisdiction,100 which states that “[a] person seeking recognition of a 
foreign judgment through a civil proceeding must obtain jurisdiction over 
any person against whom the judgment will operate” such that “the persons 
whom the judgment will bind have sufficient contacts with the forum to 
satisfy due process.”101  In “[p]roceeding[s] to enforce foreign judgments, 
however, the presence of assets belonging to any person against whom 
enforcement is sought will satisfy due process.”102 
But under Lenchysyn, creditors may seek recognition for any reason, 
and three broad purposes come to mind: to “lie in wait” for future assets, to 
seek enforcement in yet another state or country, and to preclude 
relitigation of settled issues or claims.  To understand why the Lenchyshyn 
standard violates a judgment debtor’s due process rights, we must examine 
all three of these recognition scenarios as they each present a different 
balance of interests between parties. 
 
A.  RECOGNITION IN ANTICIPATION OF FUTURE ASSETS 
 
For judgment creditors, one benefit of the Lenchyshyn rule is that non-
compliant debtors are essentially “locked out” of the jurisdiction until they 
satisfy their judgment debt.103  But even if we accepted these effects as 
desirable, Lenchyshyn still underestimates the burden of disputing the 
recognition of foreign-country judgments, particularly when compared to 
the domestication of sister-state decisions.  In other words, Lenchysyn is 
insensitive to the “burden that the judgment debtor would suffer had she to 
defend herself in various enforcing fora, even where she has no tie 
whatsoever with the jurisdiction.”104  To satisfy due process, courts and 
practitioners should consider the Restatement’s position: “A person seeking 
recognition of a foreign judgment through a civil proceeding must obtain 
jurisdiction over any person against whom the judgment will operate.”105 
A debtor with several statutory grounds to dispute recognition should 
not have the burden to appear in any state of the creditor’s choosing.106  To 
 
 100. Actions Taken at the 91st Annual Meeting, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (Jan. 8, 2016, 6:59 
PM), http://2014annualmeeting.org/actions-taken/. 
 101. Supra note 98, § 402 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 1). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See Emilio Bettoni, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments Despite the 
Lack of Assets, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 155, 174–75 (2013) (“A favorable decision rendered in any 
jurisdiction, coupled with the opportunity to recognize a foreign judgment elsewhere regardless of the 
presence of assets would grant to the prevailing company a comparative advantage were it to decide to 
invest in a country where none of the parties is present.”). 
 104. Id. at 184 (dismissing this concern). 
 105. Supra note 98, at § 402 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 1). 
 106. See Linda J. Silberman and Aaron D. Simowitz, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
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illustrate this in a hypothetical scenario, consider a small Japanese 
business, Arigato, LLC (“Arigato”), that is sued by one of their 
competitors, a larger Chinese company, Nihao Corporation (“Nihao”).  
Upon securing a sizeable money judgment in proceedings in a court in 
China, Nihao seeks recognition in New York.  Arigato currently has no 
dealings with, or assets in, the United States, let alone the Empire State.  
Moreover, Arigato considers the foreign court proceedings as unfair and 
believes the Chinese tribunal was not impartial. 
Under Lenchyshyn, despite Arigato’s lack of ties to the state, the New 
York court initiates recognition proceedings.  Although given notice, 
Arigato is caught off-guard because it has no connection to the state and 
thus had no expectation of being “haled into court” to dispute recognition 
in that jurisdiction.  Arigato, however, will feel obligated to retain local 
counsel, dispatch representatives, and generally expend resources due to 
the risk of recognition, which would prevent Arigato from ever doing 
business or holding assets in New York.  This example demonstrates how, 
by disposing of personal jurisdiction altogether, the Lenchyshyn standard 
can be unfair for debtors in foreign-country judgments and violate their 
Due Process rights. 
This scenario stands in stark contrast to the sister-state context.  While 
the Recognition Act requires separate proceedings and an examination of 
several bases for mandatory and discretionary nonrecognition, the 
Enforcement Act is little more than a formality, with the presumption that 
sister-state judgments are constitutionally entitled to recognition.  As a 
result, courts have concluded that personal jurisdiction is not required to 
recognize a sister-state judgment.107  In Gingold v. Gingold, for example, 
the plaintiff sought recognition of a New York divorce decree in California 
against her ex-husband.108  Holding that it was “not necessary for a 
California court to have jurisdiction over the person or property of an 
obligor in order to validly register a foreign support order,” the California 
Court of Appeal characterized the recognition process as a “ministerial 
duty of the clerk” which “does not prejudice any rights of the obligor.”109  
As discussed, debtors may collaterally attack the judgment but they have 
very limited grounds to dispute its presumed legitimacy.  The process of 
recognizing a sister-state judgment thus does not require full-fledged 
 
Judgments and Awards: What Hath Daimler Wrought?, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1609 (forthcoming 2016) 
(“A judgment debtor has a number of defenses available to challenge the original judgment, but a 
judgment debtor should not be forced to raise those defenses in any forum that the judgment-creditor 
might choose to bring an enforcement action.”). 
 107. Gingold v. Gingold, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1177, 1182–84 (1984). 
 108. Id. at 1180. 
 109. Id. at 1184. 
   
Winter 2016 FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS 297 
personal jurisdiction to satisfy a debtor’s due process rights. 
 
B.  RECOGNITION FOR OUT-OF-STATE ENFORCEMENT 
 
In the hypothetical above, Arigato’s dilemma is worsened by the 
possibility that Nihao would take the newly recognized New York 
judgment and seek enforcement in another state or country.110  But to what 
end?  Nihao could benefit in one of two ways by “converting” the judgment 
in one jurisdiction with the ultimate aim of enforcement elsewhere. 
First, even if the sister-state had a higher standard for domesticating 
foreign judgments, the sister-state is much more likely to respect and 
recognize the New York judgment.  An appellate court in Pennsylvania 
took this very position in Standard Chartered Bank111 when affirming a 
lower court’s decision to recognize a Bahraini judgment domesticated in 
New York.  The court stated that: 
 
[p]ursuant to the U.S. Constitution, the Full Faith and Credit 
Act, and the Enforcement Act, Standard Chartered’s New 
York judgment is, as a matter of law, entitled to full faith 
and credit in Pennsylvania as with any other judgment issued 
by a New York court. That the New York judgment 
recognized a foreign nation judgment is of no moment. Just 
as Pennsylvania courts were compelled to recognize [sister-
state judgments from New Jersey and West Virginia] 
pursuant to full faith and credit, we are similarly bound to 
recognize the instant New York judgment. Accordingly, the 
trial court did not err in giving full faith and credit to the 
New York judgment and denying AHAB’s plea to disregard 
full faith and credit and vacate the Pennsylvania judgment.112  
 
Second, a foreign country’s court may be more receptive to 
recognizing an American judgment than a Chinese one.  Indeed, the 
creditors in Electrolines sought recognition in Michigan for that reason; 
they believed an English court would more readily domesticate an 
Americanized judgment compared to the original Liberian ruling.  In these 
situations, creditors can forum shop among the States for courts amenable 
to recognition and “transfer” the judgment to out-of-state jurisdictions 
 
 110. See generally Gregory H. Shill, Ending Judgment Arbitrage: Jurisdictional Competition and 
the Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the United States, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 459, 478 
(2013) (labelling this type of forum shopping as “judgment arbitrage”).  
 111. Standard Chartered Bank, 99 A.3d at 396. 
 112. Id. at *943–44 (citations omitted). 
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where the creditor’s assets are actually located.  As a result, a judgment 
creditor’s ability to seek recognition for the purposes of out-of-state 
enforcement exacerbates the unfairness in Lenchyshyn.113 
On this point, the ALI’s position in the Restatement (Fourth) is that 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not “require a U.S. Court 
automatically to regard as conclusive the decision of another U.S. court to 
recognize, or not to recognize, a foreign judgment.”114  One rationale for 
this position is that “denying automatic enforcement of a sister-State’s 
recognition of a foreign judgment would discourage forum shopping that 
could ensue from bifurcation of the recognition and enforcement States.”115  
Although the ALI’s stance is reasonable and mitigates the unfairness 
described above, its position is insufficient as trial courts are still more 
likely to honor foreign judgments domesticated by sister-states even if 
courts are not obligated to do so under the U.S. Constitution.  If additional 
state courts join New York and Texas in casually dispensing with the 
personal jurisdiction requirement with respect to recognition proceedings, 
however, the U.S. Supreme Court may need to clarify Footnote 36 to 
ensure that state courts are not depriving judgment debtors of their liberty 
or property without the due process of law. 
 
C.  RECOGNITION FOR THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF A FOREIGN JUDGMENT 
 
Finally, parties may seek recognition in absence of assets for res 
judicata or collateral estoppel purposes, rather than for a foreign-money 
enforcement.116  For example, a debtor may defensively seek recognition to 
prevent a creditor’s relitigation of a claim or issue settled earlier overseas 
in the debtor’s favor.117  Alternatively, a creditor may offensively seek 
recognition in the U.S. to bar relitigation of particular issues of fact or law. 
These scenarios, however, would not violate the debtor’s Due Process 
rights.  In either case, courts have power over the party because the creditor 
or debtor seeking recognition is appearing in the state by choice, and thus 
voluntarily submitting themselves to the recognizing court’s jurisdiction.  
As a result, no parties consenting to a court’s authority suffer from Due 
 
 113. See Lenchyshyn, 281 A.D.2d at 43. 
 114. Supra note 98, at § 401 cmt. g (emphasis added); see also Standard Chartered Bank,  98 A.3d 
at 1004 (The Supreme Court has made clear that “the full faith and credit clause is not an inexorable 
and unqualified command.” (quoting Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Exp., 314 U.S. 201, 210 (1941)). 
 115. Id. 
 116. See Manco Contracting Co. (W.W.L.) v. Bezdikian, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 233, 243 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 481, cm. b, p. 595; Renoir v. Redstar Corp., 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 603 
(2004)) (recognizing that a party may rely on res judicata or collateral estoppel principles unrelated to 
enforcement of a money judgment). 
 117. See generally supra, note 117 and accompanying text.  
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Process violations because the question of personal jurisdiction in foreign 
money-judgment recognition proceedings does not turn on such preclusion 
scenarios. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Claimants who have won their case deserve to be made whole.  
International judgment creditors should thus have every opportunity to 
seize debtor assets wherever located.  As the Supreme Court noted in 
Shaffer, no debtor should be able to “avoid paying his obligations by 
removing his property to a state in which his creditor cannot obtain 
personal jurisdiction over him.”118 
But if state courts do not otherwise have personal jurisdiction over a 
debtor, the court should not recognize foreign-country money judgments in 
the absence of the debtor’s assets in that forum.  Considering the 
complications inherent to the foreign-country judgment recognition process 
and the potential impact on rights and liabilities, it is fundamentally unfair 
to require a judgment debtor to appear and dispute recognition in any 
jurisdiction in which they have no property and no meaningful contacts.119 
To that end, state court systems and practitioners of international 
litigation alike should resist the urge to treat the recognition of foreign-
country money judgments as a mere formality and instead take heed of the 
Due Process concerns expressed in the ALI’s position. 
 
 
     118. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 210. 
   119. Silberman, supra note 106 at 14–15.  Where creditors anticipate an influx of debtors’ assets 
into the forum state, courts should require a minimal evidentiary showing supporting such a belief while 
permitting limited discovery to identify the property expected.  Upon such a showing, there would seem 
to be no unfairness in recognizing a foreign money judgment in a state otherwise alien to debtors. 
